Appellees, whose restaurant in Birmingham, Alabama, caters to local white customers
with take-out service for Negroes, serving food a substantial portion of which
has moved in interstate commerce, sued to enjoin appellants from enforcing
against their restaurant and others Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which they claimed was unconstitutional. A three-judge District Court granted
an injunction, holding that there was no demonstrable connection between food
purchased in interstate commerce and sold in a restaurant and Congress' conclusion
that discrimination in the restaurant would affect commerce so as to warrant
regulation of local activities to protect interstate commerce.
Held:
1. Since interference with governmental action has occurred and the constitutionality
of Title II is before the Court in a companion case, the Court reaches the merits
of this case by considering the complaint as an application for declaratory judgment,
instead of denying relief for want of equity jurisdiction as it would ordinarily
do on the ground that appellees should have waited to pursue the statutory procedures
for adjudication of their rights. Pp. 295-296 .
2. Congress acted within its power to protect and foster commerce in extending
coverage of Title II to restaurants serving food a substantial portion of which
has moved in interstate commerce, since it had ample basis to conclude that racial
discrimination by such restaurants burdened interstate trade. Pp. 300-305 .
233 F.Supp. 815, reversed [p*295]
Opinions
CLARK, J., Opinion of the Court
MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case was argued with No. 515, Heart of
Atlanta Motel v. United States, decided this
date, ante, p. 241 , in which we upheld the
constitutional
validity of Title
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against an attack by hotels, motels,
and like establishments. This complaint for injunctive relief against
appellants attacks
the constitutionality of the Act as applied to a restaurant. The
case was heard by a three-judge United States
District Court and an injunction
was
issued
restraining appellants from enforcing the Act against the restaurant.
233 F.Supp. 815. On
direct appeal, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1253 (1958 ed.), we noted
probable jurisdiction. 379 U.S. 802. We now reverse the judgment.
1. The Motion to Dismiss
The appellants moved in the District Court
to dismiss the complaint for want of equity
jurisdiction and that claim is pressed here.
The
grounds
are that
the Act authorizes only preventive relief; that there has been
no threat of enforcement
against the appellees and that they have alleged no irreparable
injury. It is true that ordinarily equity
will not interfere in such cases.
However, we may
and do consider this complaint as an application for a declaratory
judgment under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 (1958 ed.). In this case, of course, direct
appeal to this Court would still lie under 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1958 [p*296]
ed.). But even though Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits
declaratory relief although another adequate remedy exists, it should not be
granted where a special statutory proceeding has been provided. See Notes on
Rule 57 of Advisory Committee on Rules, 28 U.S.C.App. 5178 (1958 ed.). Title
II provides for such a statutory proceeding for the determination of rights and
duties arising thereunder, §§ 204-207, and courts should,
therefore, ordinarily refrain from exercising their jurisdiction
in such cases.
The present case, however, is in a unique position. The interference with governmental
action has occurred and the constitutional question is before us in the companion
case of Heart of Atlanta Motel as well as in this case. It is important that
a decision on the constitutionality of the Act as applied in these cases be announced
as quickly as possible. For these reasons, we have concluded, with the above
caveat, that the denial of discretionary declaratory relief is not required here.
2. The Facts
Ollie's Barbecue is a family owned restaurant in Birmingham, Alabama, specializing
in barbecued meats and homemade pies, with a seating capacity of 220 customers.
It is located on a state highway 11 blocks from an interstate one and a somewhat
greater distance from railroad and bus stations. The restaurant caters to a family
and white-collar trade with a take-out service for Negroes. It employs 36 persons,
two-thirds of whom are Negroes.
In the 12 months preceding the passage of the Act, the restaurant purchased locally
approximately $150,000 worth of food, $69,683 or 46% of which was meat that it
bought from a local supplier who had procured it from outside the State. The
District Court expressly found that a substantial portion of the food served
in the restaurant [p*297] had moved in interstate commerce. The restaurant has
refused to serve Negroes in its dining accommodations since its original opening
in 1927, and, since July 2, 1964, it has been operating in violation of the Act.
The court below concluded that, if it were required to serve Negroes, it would
lose a substantial amount of business.
On the merits, the District Court held that
the Act could not be applied under the Fourteenth
Amendment because it
was conceded that the State of Alabama was
not involved in the refusal of the restaurant to serve
Negroes. It was also admitted that the Thirteenth Amendment
was authority neither for validating nor for invalidating
the Act. As to the Commerce Clause, the court found that
it was an express grant of power to Congress to regulate
interstate commerce, which
consists of the movement of persons, goods or information
from one state to another,
and it found that the clause was also a grant of power
to regulate intrastate activities, but only to the extent that action on its
part is necessary or appropriate to the effective execution of its expressly
granted power to regulate interstate commerce.
There must be, it said, a close and substantial relation between local activities
and interstate commerce which requires control of the former in the protection
of the latter. The court concluded, however, that the Congress, rather than finding
facts sufficient to meet this rule, had legislated a conclusive presumption that
a restaurant affects interstate commerce if it serves or offers to serve interstate
travelers or if a substantial portion of the food which it serves has moved in
commerce. This, the court held, it could not do, because there was no demonstrable
connection between food purchased in interstate commerce and sold in a restaurant
and the conclusion of Congress that discrimination in the restaurant would affect
that commerce. [p*298]
The basic holding in Heart of Atlanta Motel answers many of the contentions made
by the appellees. [n1] There, we outlined the overall purpose and operational
plan of Title II, and found it a valid exercise of the power to regulate interstate
commerce insofar as it requires hotels and motels to serve transients without
regard to their race or color. In this case, we consider its application to restaurants
which serve food a substantial portion of which has moved in commerce.
3. The Act As Applied
Section 201(a) of Title II commands that all
persons shall be entitled to the full and
equal enjoyment of
the goods
and services
of any
place of public
accommodation
without discrimination or segregation on the ground
of race, color, religion, or national origin, and § 201(b) defines establishments as places of public
accommodation if their operations affect commerce or segregation by them is supported
by state action. Sections 201(b)(2) and (c) place any "restaurant . . .
principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises" under
the Act "if . . . it serves or offers to serve
interstate travelers or a substantial portion of
the food which
it serves . . . has moved
in commerce."
Ollie's Barbecue admits that it is covered by these provisions of the Act. The
Government makes no contention that the discrimination at the restaurant was
supported by the State of Alabama. There is no claim that interstate travelers
frequented the restaurant. The sole question, therefore, narrows down to whether
Title II, as applied to a restaurant annually receiving about $70,000 worth of
food which has moved in commerce, is a valid exercise of the power of Congress.
The Government [p*299] has contended that Congress had ample basis upon which
to find that racial discrimination at restaurants which receive from out of state
a substantial portion of the food served does, in fact, impose commercial burdens
of national magnitude upon interstate commerce. The appellees' major argument
is directed to this premise. They urge that no such basis existed. It is to that
question that we now turn.
4. The Congressional Hearings
As we noted in Heart of Atlanta Motel, both
Houses of Congress conducted prolonged hearings
on the Act.
And,
as we said
there, while no formal
findings were made,
which, of course, are not necessary, it is well
that we make mention of the testimony at
these hearings
the better
to
understand the
problem before
Congress
and determine
whether the Act is a reasonable and appropriate
means toward its solution. The record is
replete with testimony
of the
burdens placed
on interstate
commerce by racial discrimination in restaurants.
A comparison of per capita spending
by Negroes in restaurants, theaters, and like establishments
indicated less spending,
after discounting income differences, in areas
where discrimination is widely practiced.
This condition,
which was especially
aggravated in
the South,
was attributed in the testimony of the Under Secretary
of Commerce to racial segregation.
See Hearings before the Senate Committee on Commerce
on S. 1732, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 695. This diminutive
spending
springing
from a refusal
to serve
Negroes and their total loss as customers has,
regardless of the absence of direct evidence,
a close connection to interstate commerce. The
fewer
customers a restaurant enjoys, the less food it
sells, and consequently
the less
it buys.
S.Rep. No. 872, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess., at 19; Senate Commerce Committee
Hearings at 207. In addition, the Attorney General
testified
that this type
of discrimination
imposed "an
artificial restriction on the market," and
interfered [p*300] with the flow of merchandise.
Id. at 18-19;
also, on this point,
see testimony
of
Senator Magnuson,
110 Cong.Rec. 7402-7403. In addition, there were
many references to discriminatory situations causing
wide
unrest and having
a depressant effect on general
business conditions in the respective communities.
See, e.g., Senate Commerce Committee
Hearings at 623-630, 695-700, 1384-1385.
Moreover, there was an impressive array of testimony that discrimination in restaurants
had a direct and highly restrictive effect upon interstate travel by Negroes.
This resulted, it was said, because discriminatory practices prevent Negroes
from buying prepared food served on the premises while on a trip, except in isolated
and unkempt restaurants and under most unsatisfactory and often unpleasant conditions.
This obviously discourages travel and obstructs interstate commerce, for one
can hardly travel without eating. Likewise, it was said that discrimination deterred
professional as well as skilled people from moving into areas where such practices
occurred, and thereby caused industry to be reluctant to establish there. S.Rep.
No. 872, supra, at 18-19.
We believe that this testimony afforded ample
basis for the conclusion that established restaurants
in such areas
sold
less interstate
goods because of the discrimination,
that interstate travel was obstructed directly
by it, that business in general
suffered, and that many new businesses refrained
from establishing there as a result of it.
Hence, the District
Court was
in error in concluding
that there
was no connection between discrimination and
the
movement of interstate commerce. The court's
conclusion that
such a connection
is outside "common experience" flies
in the face of stubborn fact.
It goes without saying that, viewed in isolation, the volume of food purchased
by Ollie's Barbecue from sources supplied from out of state was insignificant
when [p*301] compared with the total foodstuffs moving in commerce. But, as our
late Brother Jackson said for the Court in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942):
That appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself
is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here,
his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated,
is far from trivial.
At 127-128 .
We noted in Heart of Atlanta Motel that a number of witnesses attested to the
fact that racial discrimination was not merely a state or regional problem, but
was one of nationwide scope. Against this background, we must conclude that,
while the focus of the legislation was on the individual restaurant's relation
to interstate commerce, Congress appropriately considered the importance of that
connection with the knowledge that the discrimination was but
representative of many others throughout the country, the total incidence of
which, if left unchecked, may well become far-reaching in its harm to commerce.
Polish Alliance v. Labor Board, 322 U.S. 643, 648 (1944).
With this situation spreading as the record shows, Congress was not required
to await the total dislocation of commerce. As was said in Consolidated Edison
Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U.S. 197 (1938):
But it cannot be maintained that the exertion of federal power must await the
disruption of that commerce. Congress was entitled to provide reasonable preventive
measures and that was the object of the National Labor Relations Act.
At 222.
5. The Power of Congress to Regulate Local Activities
Article I, § 8, cl. 3, confers upon Congress the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States" and Clause 18 of the same Article
grants it the power [p*302] "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers. . . ." This
grant, as we have pointed out in Heart
of Atlanta Motel,
extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce, or
the exertion of the power of Congress over it, as to make regulation of them
appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the effective execution
of the granted power to regulate interstate commerce.
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942). Much is said
about a restaurant business being local, but,
even if appellee's activity be local, and though it may not be regarded as commerce,
it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce. . . .
Wickard v. Filburn, supra, at 125 . The activities that are beyond the reach
of Congress are
those which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other
States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing
some of the general powers of the government.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 , 195 (1824). This rule is as good today as it was
when Chief Justice Marshall laid it down almost a century and a half ago.
This Court has held time and again that this power extends to activities of retail
establishments, including restaurants, which directly or indirectly burden or
obstruct interstate commerce. We have detailed the cases in Heart of Atlanta
Motel, and will not repeat them here.
Nor are the cases holding that interstate commerce ends when goods come to rest
in the State of destination apposite here. That line of cases has been applied
with reference to state taxation or regulation, but not in the field of federal
regulation.
The appellees contend that Congress has
arbitrarily created a conclusive presumption
that all
restaurants [p*303]
meeting the
criteria set
out in the Act "affect
commerce." Stated another way, they
object to the omission of a provision
for a case-by-case
determination
-- judicial
or administrative
-- that
racial discrimination in a particular
restaurant affects commerce.
But Congress' action in framing this Act was not unprecedented. In United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), this Court held constitutional the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938. [n2] There, Congress determined that the payment of substandard
wages to employees engaged in the production of goods for commerce, while not
itself commerce, so inhibited it as to be subject to federal regulation. The
appellees in that case argued, as do the appellees here, that the Act was invalid
because it included no provision for an independent inquiry regarding the effect
on commerce of substandard wages in a particular business. (Brief for appellees,
pp. 76-77, United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 .) But the Court rejected the
argument, observing that:
[S]ometimes Congress itself has said that a particular activity affects the commerce,
as it did in the present Act, the Safety Appliance Act, and the Railway Labor
Act. In passing on the validity of legislation of the class last mentioned the
only function of courts is to determine whether the particular activity regulated
or prohibited is within the reach of the federal power.
At 120-121 .
Here, as there, Congress has determined for itself that refusals of service to
Negroes have imposed burdens both upon the interstate flow of food and upon the
movement of products generally. Of course, the mere fact that Congress has said
when particular activity shall be deemed to affect commerce does not preclude
further examination by this Court. But where we find that the legislators, in
[p*304] light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for
finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, oar
investigation is at an end. The only remaining question -- one answered in the
affirmative by the court below -- is whether the particular restaurant either
serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or serves food a substantial portion
of which has moved in interstate commerce.
The appellees urge that Congress, in passing the Fair Labor Standards Act and
the National Labor Relations Act, [n3] made specific findings which were embodied
in those statutes. Here, of course, Congress has included no formal findings.
But their absence is not fatal to the validity of the statute, see United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 , 152 (1938), for the evidence presented
at the hearings fully indicated the nature and effect of the burdens on commerce
which Congress meant to alleviate.
Confronted as we are with the facts laid
before Congress, we must conclude that
it had a rational
basis for
finding that
racial discrimination
in restaurants had a direct and adverse
effect on the free flow of interstate
commerce.
Insofar as the sections of the Act here
relevant are concerned, §§ 201(b)(2)
and (c), Congress prohibited discrimination
only in those establishments having a
close tie to
interstate commerce,
i.e., those, like
the McClungs', serving
food that has come from out of the State.
We think, in so doing, that Congress
acted well
within its
power
to
protect
and foster
commerce in extending
the coverage of Title II only to those
restaurants offering to serve interstate
travelers
or serving food, a substantial portion
of which has moved in interstate commerce.
The absence of direct evidence connecting discriminatory restaurant service with
the flow of interstate food, [p*305] a factor on which the appellees place much
reliance, is not, given the evidence as to the effect of such practices on other
aspects of commerce, a crucial matter.
The power of Congress in this field is broad and sweeping; where it keeps within
its sphere and violates no express constitutional limitation it has been the
rule of this Court, going back almost to the founding days of the Republic, not
to interfere. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, as here applied, we find to be plainly
appropriate in the resolution of what the Congress found to be a national commercial
problem of the first magnitude. We find it in no violation of any express limitations
of the Constitution and we therefore declare it valid.
The judgment is therefore Reversed.
[For concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK, see ante, p. 268 .]
[For concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE Douglas, see ante, p. 279 .]
[For concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG, see ante, p. 291 .]
1. That decision disposes of the challenges that the appellees base on the Fifth,
Ninth, Tenth, and Thirteenth Amendments, and on the Civil Rights Case, 109 U.S.
3 (1883).
2. 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. § 201
et seq. (1958 ed.).
3. 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151
et seq. (1958 ed.).
