Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus
(headnote) will be released, as is being done
in connection with this case, at the time the
opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter
of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber
Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
TROXEL
et vir. v. GRANVILLE
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON
No. 99—138. Argued January 12, 2000–Decided
June 5, 2000
Washington Rev. Code §26.10.160(3) permits “[a]ny
person” to petition for visitation rights “at
any time” and authorizes state superior
courts to grant such rights whenever visitation
may serve a child’s best interest. Petitioners
Troxel petitioned for the right to visit their
deceased son’s daughters. Respondent
Granville, the girls’ mother, did not
oppose all visitation, but objected to the
amount sought by the Troxels. The Superior
Court ordered more visitation than Granville
desired, and she appealed. The State Court
of Appeals reversed and dismissed the Troxels’ petition.
In affirming, the State Supreme Court held,
inter alia, that §26.10.160(3) unconstitutionally
infringes on parents’ fundamental right
to rear their children. Reasoning that the
Federal Constitution permits a State to interfere
with this right only to prevent harm or potential
harm to the child, it found that §26.10.160(3)
does not require a threshold showing of
harm and sweeps too broadly by permitting
any
person to petition at any time with the
only requirement
being that the visitation serve the best
interest of the child.
Held: The judgment
is affirmed.
137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d 21, affirmed.
Justice O’Connor, joined by The Chief
Justice, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer,
concluded that §26.10.160(3), as applied
to Granville and her family, violates her due
process right to make decisions concerning
the care, custody, and control of her daughters.
Pp. 5—17.
(a) The Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause has a substantive component
that “provides heightened protection
against government interference with certain
fundamental rights and liberty interests,” Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720, including
parents’ fundamental right to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of
their children, see, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 651. Pp. 5—8.
(b) Washington’s breathtakingly
broad statute effectively permits a court to
disregard and overturn any decision by a fit
custodial parent concerning visitation whenever
a third party affected by the decision files
a visitation petition, based solely on the
judge’s determination of the child’s
best interest. A parent’s estimation
of the child’s best interest is accorded
no deference. The State Supreme Court had the
opportunity, but declined, to give §26.10.160(3)
a narrower reading. A combination of several
factors compels the conclusion that §26.10.160(3),
as applied here, exceeded the bounds of the
Due Process Clause. First, the Troxels did
not allege, and no court has found, that Granville
was an unfit parent. There is a presumption
that fit parents act in their children’s
best interests, Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S.
584, 602; there is normally no reason for the
State to inject itself into the private realm
of the family to further question fit parents’ ability
to make the best decisions regarding their
children, see, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.
292, 304. The problem here is not that the
Superior Court intervened, but that when it
did so, it gave no special weight to Granville’s
determination of her daughters’ best
interests. More importantly, that court appears
to have applied the opposite presumption, favoring
grandparent visitation. In effect, it placed
on Granville the burden of disproving that
visitation would be in her daughters’ best
interest and thus failed to provide any protection
for her fundamental right. The court also gave
no weight to Granville’s having assented
to visitation even before the filing of the
petition or subsequent court intervention.
These factors, when considered with the Superior
Court’s slender findings, show that this
case involves nothing more than a simple disagreement
between the court and Granville concerning
her children’s best interests, and that
the visitation order was an unconstitutional
infringement on Granville’s right to
make decisions regarding the rearing of her
children. Pp. 8—14.
(c) Because the instant decision rests
on §26.10.160(3)’s sweeping breadth
and its application here, there is no need
to consider the question whether the Due Process
Clause requires all nonparental visitation
statutes to include a showing of harm or potential
harm to the child as a condition precedent
to granting visitation or to decide the precise
scope of the parental due process right in
the visitation context. There is also no reason
to remand this case for further proceedings.
The visitation order clearly violated the Constitution,
and the parties should not be forced into additional
litigation that would further burden Granville’s
parental right. Pp. 14—17.
Justice Souter concluded that the Washington
Supreme Court’s second reason for invalidating
its own state statute–that it sweeps
too broadly in authorizing any person at any
time to request (and a judge to award) visitation
rights, subject only to the State’s particular
best-interests standard–is consistent
with this Court’s prior cases. This ends
the case, and there is no need to decide whether
harm is required or to consider the precise
scope of a parent’s right or its necessary
protections. Pp. 1—5.
Justice Thomas agreed that this Court’s
recognition of a fundamental right of parents
to direct their children’s upbringing
resolves this case, but concluded that strict
scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review
to apply to infringements of fundamental rights.
Here, the State lacks a compelling interest
in second-guessing a fit parent’s decision
regarding visitation with third parties. Pp. 1—2.
O’Connor, J., announced the judgment
of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which
Rehnquist, C. J., and Ginsburg
and Breyer, JJ., joined. Souter, J.,
and Thomas,
J.,
filed opinions concurring in the judgment.
Stevens,
J., Scalia, J., and Kennedy, J., filed
dissenting opinions.
